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1 Introduction
Since the final dissolution of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, bilateral exchange rate
arrangements between the United States and the other G-7 nations have been predomi-
nantly characterized by flexible exchange rate regimes. In a flexible exchange rate world,
the classic Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (MFD) model predicts that expansionary domes-
tic monetary policy generates an exchange rate depreciation. Foreign interest rates are
assumed to be exogenously set, and are thus unchanged. As a result of the exchange rate
depreciation, the relative prices of Home goods fall, leading to an increase in the relative
consumption of Home goods by domestic and foreign residents. The famous ‘beggar-
thy-neighbor’ effect ensues, with Home output rising and Foreign output falling. The
increased purchasing power of Foreign currency leads to a fall in the Foreign price level,
both from a direct valuation effect and from substitution within the Foreign consumption
bundle towards Home goods.
The evidence for such a pattern of effects is mixed. There is a general consensus that
expansionary U.S. monetary policy results in an eventual dollar depreciation, but the
timing and magnitude of the depreciation varies across studies (e.g., Eichenbaum and
Evans [1995]; Kim and Roubini [2000]; Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright [2003]). The
consequences of expansionary U.S. monetary policy for foreign interest rates, outputs and
prices are more controversial. Foreign short rates are found to be completely unresponsive
in some studies [Kim, 2001], while others indicate that foreign rates fall initially and then
converge back to their long-run levels [Faust et al., 2003]. To the extent that foreign
outputs and prices respond to U.S. monetary policy, their movements are often more
consistent with a ‘prosper-thy-neighbor’ effect, counter to the logic of the classic model.
The primary policy target of the Federal Reserve since the early 1970s has been
the federal funds rate, a market-based, overnight, interbank rate [Meulendyke, 1998].1
Consequently, the majority of studies employ the federal funds rate as their measure
of U.S. monetary policy. To consistently estimate the open economy consequences of
1A notable exception is the Volcker monetary growth targeting experiment from 1979-1981.
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U.S. monetary policy, it is important to identify federal funds rate changes which are:
(1) unpredictable using the information set available to the market at the time of policy
interventions; and, (2) independent of other determinants of open economy variables (e.g.,
inflationary supply shocks).
Unpredictability is necessary for identification since forward-looking and fast-moving
variables such as the exchange rate and foreign interest rate can respond in advance of
anticipated federal funds rate changes. Empirical work which gauges monetary policy ef-
fectiveness in terms of its contemporaneous and lagged impacts neglects responses based
upon changes in expected future monetary policy, even though they are indicative of
policy effectiveness. Such temporal decoupling attenuates the estimated exchange rate
and foreign interest rate responses to federal funds rate changes. Independence is neces-
sary for identification because some federal funds rate changes are endogenous to other
variables which affect the exchange rate and foreign interest rate via channels unrelated
to monetary policy. For example, U.S. policymakers may increase the federal funds rate
in response to an inflation innovation. If the real exchange rate is mean-reverting, a
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will be required in order to offset the effects of
higher domestic prices following the inflation innovation. This attenuates the exchange
rate appreciation associated with an increase in the federal funds rate.
Foreign variables which are linked to the exchange rate will correspondingly show a
weak response to U.S. monetary policy changes. For example, if foreign interest rates
respond to the exchange rate, either directly as part of a managed float or indirectly
through the expected impact of the exchange rate on foreign output and prices, attenua-
tion bias in the exchange rate response will lead to a dampening of the reaction of foreign
interest rates to U.S. monetary policy. Biases in the exchange rate and foreign interest
rate responses then affect the estimated foreign output and price effects of U.S. monetary
policy.
In this paper, we use the new monetary policy identification procedure introduced by
Romer and Romer [2004] to estimate the open economy consequences of U.S. monetary
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policy. Romer and Romer combine information on the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee’s (FOMC) intentions from the narrative records of its meetings with the Federal
Reserve’s Greenbook (in-house) forecasts of U.S. inflation, output growth, and unem-
ployment. They then recover the component of intended federal funds rate changes
around FOMC meetings that is orthogonal to the Federal Reserve’s information set. We
construct a daily-weighted, monthly average federal funds rate series from Romer and
Romer’s meetings-based series which exhibits the key properties of unpredictability and
independence from alternative open economy determinants. Our principal contribution
is to examine the responses of open economy variables to the resulting unpredictable and
independent monthly average U.S. federal funds rate in six bilateral models (U.S. versus
the other G-7 nations). We find that the peak effects of unpredictable and independent
federal funds rate changes on bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates are up to four times
larger than those associated with recursively-identified innovations to the actual federal
funds rate.
We also find that interest rate pass-through from the U.S. to other G-7 countries
following unpredictable and independent federal funds rate changes is positive and larger
than that observed following recursively-identified federal funds rate innovations. How-
ever, at horizons beyond two years, interest rate pass-through turns negative. We ra-
tionalize this observation by augmenting our models with a measure of predictable U.S.
monetary policy which is shown to offset the effects of unpredictable and independent
federal funds rate changes. The foreign interest rate tracks these stabilizing federal funds
rate movements, generating negative interest rate pass-through at horizons of two to
three years following an unpredictable change in the federal funds rate. Our results for
foreign outputs and foreign prices are consistent with a prosper-thy-neighbor as opposed
to a beggar-thy-neighbor effect – foreign outputs and prices are positively correlated with
U.S. output and prices in the wake of unpredictable U.S. monetary policy. In contrast,
prosper-thy-neighbor effects are either weak or absent following recursively-identified fed-
eral funds rate innovations.
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We compare our results with those recently obtained using alternative identification
schemes based upon: (1) non-recursive (structural) VAR restrictions; and (2) VAR re-
strictions derived from high frequency asset price behavior. Specifically, we compare our
open economy variable impulse responses to those of Kim and Roubini [2000] and Faust,
Rogers, Swanson, and Wright [2003]. Kim and Roubini [2000] impose non-recursive,
contemporaneous VAR restrictions to identify U.S. monetary policy innovations to the
federal funds rate. Faust et al. [2003] identify U.S. monetary policy’s effects from daily
changes in exchange rate and interest rate futures and spot rates, using the estimated
effects to restrict the impulse responses from a VAR. Our results are more consistent
with Faust et al.’s broad findings in their partially identified VAR than they are with
Kim and Roubini’s non-recursively identified VAR. We are thus able to provide some
cross-validation for U.S. monetary policy identification that is based upon high frequency
asset price movements.
However, our analysis goes beyond validating results from alternative identification
schemes. As the approach that we adopt is more readily implementable than that based
upon high frequency data, we are able to demonstrate that monetary policy identification
using information from outside the VAR matters for a broader range of bilateral US$
exchange rates. Furthermore, we document new results concerning foreign short-term
interest rates, foreign outputs and foreign prices. We also analyze the path of predictable
U.S. monetary policy that follows an unpredictable U.S. monetary policy change, linking
such behavior to open economy adjustment.
We carry out a series of robustness tests. We exploit the fact that the monetary policy
changes are identified from outside the model to estimate impulse responses that allow
for contemporaneous effects of monetary policy on each variable in the VAR, without
assuming that the variables are linked by a particular recursive causal ordering. In
addition, we augment the models with additional controls, vary the lag structure of the
VAR, and undertake sub-sample sensitivity analysis. Overall, the results are robust to
these perturbations.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly review theoretical work on the
open economy consequences of monetary policy. We discuss the importance of the un-
predictability and independence properties in monetary policy identification, explaining
how the absence of these properties can lead to attenuation bias in the estimated effect
of domestic monetary policy upon foreign variables. We then introduce our identifica-
tion strategy and compare it with alternative schemes from the literature. In section 3,
we describe our empirical methodology and the data employed. Then, in section 4, we
present our results. We explore the robustness of our findings in section 5, and conclude
with a brief summary and discussion in section 6.
2 Monetary policy and the open economy
In this section, we first present a brief review of how domestic monetary policy affects
open economy variables in theory. We then discuss monetary policy identification in
the open economy context, describing how identification failures may lead to attenuation
bias. We argue that the procedure advocated by Romer and Romer [2004] addresses the
sources of identification failure in the open economy context. Finally, we close the section
by comparing our open economy identification strategy with alternative approaches.
2.1 Theoretical perspectives
As mentioned in the introduction, the classic MFD model predicts a beggar-thy-neighbor
effect of unanticipated domestic monetary policy – Home and Foreign outputs (and prices)
are negatively correlated. These open economy effects of domestic monetary policy arise
from the interaction of: (1) nominal rigidities; (2) the pure jump variable behavior of
the exchange rate; and (3) complete exchange rate pass-through to traded goods’ prices.
Foreign monetary policy is assumed to be unreactive to domestic monetary policy changes.
Inaugurating the new open economy macroeconomics literature, Obstfeld and Rogoff
[1995, 1996] constructed a micro-founded open economy macroeconomic model which
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incorporated nominal rigidities and monopoly distortions. Their analysis replicated the
beggar-thy-neighbor effect (in terms of output responses) of unanticipated domestic mon-
etary policy in the MFD model. However, they also demonstrated that expansionary
domestic monetary policy is welfare-increasing for both Home and Foreign, as it miti-
gates monopoly distortions in the goods market and improves Foreign’s terms-of-trade.
Corsetti and Pesenti [2001] extended the model, showing that an unanticipated domestic
monetary expansion may be Home welfare-decreasing if the accompanying terms-of-trade
depreciation is sufficiently large. Foreign welfare unambiguously increases. The conse-
quences for Foreign output depend upon the degree of consumption complementarity
between Home and Foreign goods. If Home and Foreign goods are complements, then
unanticipated domestic monetary policy generates a prosper-thy-neighbor effect.2
2.2 The identification problem
The accurate estimation of U.S. monetary policy’s open economy effects requires that
an empirical analogue to the theoretical concept of a monetary policy intervention be
identified. Accordingly, the U.S. monetary policy measure employed must be: (1) unpre-
dictable using the market’s best information available at the time of intervention; and,
(2) independent of other determinants of open economy variables.
To see the importance of identifying unpredictable federal funds rate changes, sup-
pose that the market correctly anticipates a Federal Reserve interest rate increase in a
quarter’s time. In the absence of adjustment costs, agents should change their portfo-
lios at the time at which information regarding the Federal Reserve’s behaviour becomes
known. The exchange rate then moves in advance of the federal funds rate, leading to
attenuation bias when the estimated exchange rate response is a function of the contem-
poraneous correlation of exchange rate changes and actual federal funds rate changes. A
simple Cagan-style model in which the exchange rate is related to the expected future
2In all of these models, the exchange rate behaves as a pure jump variable and exchange rate pass-
through to prices is complete. There are several papers which relax these assumptions, such as Bacchetta
and van Wincoop [2005] and Betts and Devereux [2000].
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path of monetary policy captures this intuition. A proper accounting of the impact of
U.S. monetary policy on the exchange rate and foreign variables therefore requires that
unpredictable U.S. interest rate changes be isolated.
In addition to being unpredictable, the federal funds rate changes employed must
be independent of other open economy drivers. If they are not independent, then the
estimation may suffer from an attenuating omitted variable bias. Consider the following
simple, illustrative model:
yt = α− βit + ut
it = γ + ζ (yt − y¯) + et
p¯t − p¯t−1 = φ (yt − y¯)
st = s¯t = p¯t
y¯ = α− βγ
γ = i∗.
The variables here are: y, output; i, the monetary policy rate; u, the unpredictable
output component; p¯, the shadow (flexible) price level; y¯, the natural level of output; e,
the unpredictable and independent interest rate component; s, the exchange rate; and i∗,
the exogenous foreign interest rate. Variables with overbars and time subscripts denote
the shadow level of the variable. All parameters are denoted by Greek letters and are
assumed to be positive. The equations here may then be interpreted as: (1) an IS curve;
(2) a monetary policy reaction function; (3) a shadow Phillips curve; and (4) long-run
purchasing power parity (a mean-reverting real exchange rate).
Substituting the monetary policy reaction function into the IS curve, we have that:
yt = y¯ −
(
β
1 + βζ
)
et +
( 1
1 + βζ
)
ut, and
it = γ +
( 1
1 + βζ
)
et +
(
ζ
1 + βζ
)
ut.
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The change in the exchange rate from last period is then given by:
st − st−1 = p¯t − p¯t−1
= φ (yt − y¯)
= φ
[
y¯ −
(
β
1 + βζ
)
et +
( 1
1 + βζ
)
ut − y¯
]
= −
(
βφ
1 + βζ
)
et +
(
φ
1 + βζ
)
ut.
Thus, the impact effect of the unpredictable and independent interest rate component
e is to appreciate the currency, while that of the unpredictable output component u
is to depreciate the currency.3 In contrast, both e and u increase the interest rate.
Empirical work which mixes independent and dependent interest rate changes will result
in attenuation bias in the exchange rate response to the federal funds rate. A biased
exchange rate response in turn affects the estimated responses of foreign variables, such
as interest rates, outputs and prices.
2.3 A new measure of monetary policy
The U.S. monetary policy measure that we employ builds upon the narrative approach to
identification, which uses historical documentation to identify monetary policy changes.4
Romer and Romer [2004] (henceforth R&R) have refined the use of narrative evidence
by means of a two-step procedure applied to the United States’ Federal Reserve Bank’s
monetary policy over the period 1969-1996. They employ the monetary policy measure
thus derived to estimate how the U.S. economy responds to monetary policy.
In the first step, the narrative evidence is used to determine the size of the intended
3The different exchange rate effects of the two types of shocks are reminiscent of the analysis under-
taken by Engel and Frankel [1984]. From the logic of the Fisher equation, they contend that the response
of the exchange rate to nominal interest rate changes distinguishes expected inflation changes and real
interest rate changes. For nominal interest rate increases, exchange rate depreciations indicate expected
inflation increases, while exchange rate appreciations indicate real interest rate increases.
4The origins of the narrative approach date from Friedman and Schwartz’s [1963] review of the
monetary history of the United States. Romer and Romer [1989] formalized the approach in their
analysis of FOMC meeting minutes to determine the dates of exogenous monetary policy contractions.
8
change in the federal funds rate. Unintended federal funds rate changes may be caused by
market fluctuations which are unrelated to Federal Reserve choices. In the second step,
once the intended federal funds rate changes have been identified, they are decomposed
into predictable and unpredictable components using real-time information on the current
and expected future path of the U.S. economy. Specifically, R&R regress the intended
federal funds rate change upon the Greenbook forecasts of inflation, output growth, and
unemployment available just prior to an FOMC meeting. These forecasts refer to horizons
up to two quarters beyond the current quarter.5 They represent the Federal Reserve’s
central objective variables.6 The residuals from this regression are the federal funds
rate target changes which are orthogonal to the Federal Reserve’s forecasts. Romer and
Romer [2000] showed that the Greenbook forecasts encompass alternative private-sector
forecasts, indicating that the Greenbook forecasts are likely the most informative. This
encompassing property of the Greenbook forecasts is important in that it ensures that
the orthogonalization eliminates as much dependence in the intended federal funds rate
as possible.
In our open economy investigation, the unpredictable and independent U.S. monetary
policy measure is a daily-weighted monthly average series constructed from the FOMC
meeting frequency data. Specifically, we take the regression residuals from R&R’s second
step and cumulate them by days. The cumulated daily level series is then used to generate
a monthly average unpredictable and independent federal funds rate measure. A similar
procedure applied to the regression fitted values generates a monthly average predictable
and dependent federal funds rate measure.7
5The forecasts used in the identification procedure outlined here are available in real-time, although
the policy innovations could not have been generated in real-time because the first stage narrative
evidence is evaluated ex post. See Croushore and Evans [forthcoming] for a discussion of the implications
of real-time monetary policy identification.
6See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve [2005] or the International Banking Act of 1978 (the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
7Strictly speaking, the predictable component changes each day with new information and not just
prior to FOMC meetings. This implies that in making the conversion from meeting frequency to monthly
frequency data, predictable changes in the federal funds rate should be weighted according to the date
at which they become predictable. However, such dates are unobserved, and therefore we use weights
based upon the date at which the predictable change is implemented.
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To ensure independence in the open economy context, one might argue that the in-
tended federal funds rate changes should be orthogonal to forecasts of future exchange
rates and foreign variables. However, there are two arguments against such an approach.
Firstly, the Federal Reserve generally does not target exchange rates or foreign vari-
ables directly [Meulendyke, 1998]. Furthermore, effective exchange rate forecasts are
notoriously difficult to formulate.8 Secondly, exchange rates and foreign variables likely
affect Federal Reserve decisions via inflation, output growth, and unemployment fore-
casts. However, this implies that the appropriate orthogonalization to be made is exactly
the one undertaken: regress the intended federal funds rate on U.S. domestic economic
forecasts and recover the residuals.
By orthogonalizing intended federal funds rate changes against the current and future
forecast values of the Federal Reserve’s central objective variables, the Federal Reserve’s
systematic interest rate response to the current and expected state of the U.S. economy
is removed. The residuals then represent the unpredictable and independent component
of federal funds rate changes, corresponding to the open economy thought experiment
alluded to in section 2.1. Some predictability and dependence likely remains in the
monetary policy measure due to the exclusion of some variables and forecast horizons
from the orthogonalization. In the event that the new monetary policy measure still
contains predictable and/or dependent components, the magnitudes of the estimated
open economy effects represent a lower bound for the true effects.
2.4 Other identification approaches
We close this section with a discussion of alternative approaches to open economy mone-
tary policy identification, describing some of their results. In section 4, we will compare
our results with those outlined here.
Many of the papers which estimate the open economy consequences of U.S. monetary
policy fit a VAR for a system of open economy variables. Monetary policy changes are
8This is famously demonstrated by Meese and Rogoff [1983].
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identified by imposing restrictions upon the behaviour of the system’s unobserved inno-
vations. Most commonly, the contemporaneous linkages between variables are restricted
so that a Wold causal chain may be defined (a recursive identification scheme).9 The
canonical open economy example of such an identification approach is Eichenbaum and
Evans’ [1995] paper, which considers the U.S. versus the non-U.S. G-7 in a set of bilateral
VARs. Monetary contractions in the U.S. are shown to appreciate the US$, although the
time until the maximum appreciation is up to three years in some cases.
Kim and Roubini [2000] argue that the short-run restrictions implied by a recur-
sive identification scheme are likely invalid for the open economy. They identify U.S.
monetary policy by assuming that the federal funds rate responds only to its own inno-
vation and to innovations in the world oil price. In contrast to Eichenbaum and Evans’s
study, the foreign interest rate is allowed to respond contemporaneously to exchange rate
movements. The maximum exchange rate appreciation associated with a 100 basis point
federal funds rate innovation ranges from 0.6% to 1.8%.10 Foreign interest rates show a
generally positive response, with the maximum pass-through ranging from 20% to 62%.
Foreign output and prices generally rise in response to a U.S. federal funds rate increase,
albeit only weakly. The maximum foreign output increase ranges from approximately
0.15% to 0.6%, gradually declining and becoming negative at more distant horizons. The
maximum foreign price increase ranges from 0.35% to 0.6%, typically staying positive
and asymptoting to zero.11
Faust, Rogers, Swanson, andWright [2003] follow Kuttner [2001] by employing changes
in federal funds rate futures’ prices around FOMC meetings to identify unpredictable U.S.
monetary policy changes. Using high frequency data, they regress observed changes in
the exchange rate and the prices of one, three and six month-forward federal funds rate
and foreign interest rate futures on the change in the federal funds rate target at the
9The Wold causal chain is reflected in the ordering of the variables in a recursive VAR, as this order
affects the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix [Sims, 1980].
10See Kim and Roubini [2000], Figure 4.
11Their estimated UK price response shows a dramatic, persistent decline, counter to the other coun-
tries’ responses.
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time of the FOMC announcement. If exchange rates and asset prices embody market
expectations and if risk premia are constant, the fitted values from such a regression
give the effects of an unpredictable change in the federal funds rate at horizons of zero,
three and six months for the respective variables. Eichenbaum and Evans’ [1995] open
economy VAR is then identified by assuming that monetary policy in the monthly data
replicates the effects identified from the high frequency data regressions. The remainder
of the VAR’s contemporaneous relationships are partially identified, using the procedure
outlined in Faust and Rogers [2003]. Faust et al. [2003] are then able to bound the likely
impulse responses. Due to high frequency data limitations, they only consider the U.S.’s
bilateral relationships with Germany and the United Kingdom.12 In response to a 100
basis point federal funds rate innovation, Faust et al. find a maximum exchange rate
appreciation which ranges from 1% to 7.2% for Germany and 1% to 4% for the UK.
The maximum foreign interest rate pass-through ranges from 20% to 80% for Germany
and 40% to 120% for the UK. There is an initial foreign output rise, but this is quickly
reversed. The predominant response to a federal funds rate increase is a foreign output
reduction, counter to that reported by Kim and Roubini [2000]. The maximum output
decline ranges from 0.2% to 1.2% for Germany and 0.2% to 1.6% for the UK.
3 Econometric methodology and data
In order to gauge the impact of U.S. monetary policy in the open economy, we estimate
a set of six bilateral open economy VARs (U.S. versus the non-U.S. G-7).13 The baseline
VAR specification we employ is:
[y , p, y∗, p∗, r, r∗, s]′ ,
12The high frequency asset price identification procedure requires highly liquid markets in a variety of
financial instruments.
13The non-U.S. G-7 includes: Canada; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; and the United Kingdom.
Their respective currencies are denoted: CN$; FRF; GRM; IT₤; JP¥; and UK£.
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where y is the log of a U.S. industrial production index, p is the log of the U.S. CPI, y∗
is the log of a foreign industrial production index, p∗ is the log of a foreign price index,
r is the U.S. short-term policy rate, r∗ is the foreign short-term interest rate, and s is
the bilateral dollar exchange rate. The exchange rate is defined as the US$ price of one
unit of foreign currency, so that a fall in the exchange rate is a US$ appreciation. The
VAR includes a full set of monthly dummies and each variable enters with 12 lags.14 The
VAR is estimated with monthly data which covers the period from 1969-1996.15 A full
description of data sources is provided in the appendix.
Figure 1 depicts: the actual federal funds rate (FF); the unpredictable, independent
component of the federal funds rate (UM); and the predictable, dependent component of
the federal funds rate (PM). The construction of UM and PM was described earlier in
section 2.3. The series are normalized to start at zero. As can be seen, there are important
differences across the series, with the predictable, dependent component of monetary
policy being much more closely related to the actual federal funds rate’s movements than
the unpredictable, independent component. Our baseline comparison considers the above
VAR with either FF or UM as the U.S. interest rate measure r.
In calculating impulse response functions, we first assume a recursive causal ordering,
allowing the effects of orthogonal changes in FF and UM to be compared. The ordering
is given by the sequence of variables listed above, and reflects the belief that financial
market variables should be treated as most endogenous because they typically move faster
than goods market variables. Given the leading role played by the U.S. in international
financial markets, we place the U.S. interest rate above the foreign interest rate and
the exchange rate in the ordering. This means that foreign interest rates may respond
contemporaneously to U.S. interest rates. Previous work has shown that it is important
to allow for this possibility [Faust and Rogers, 2003]. Our results are robust to plausible
14Although many previous studies have employed 6 lags, we find that the shorter lag structure leads
to residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. This problem is rectified by using the longer lag
structure. The appendix provides a full set of VAR residual diagnostic tests. In section 5.3, we discuss
results based on VARs containing 6 lags.
15Exact estimation periods vary by country according to data availability. In general, the full sample
is 1972:1 to 1996:12, except for the United Kingdom (1973:1 to 1996:12) and Canada (1976:1 to 1996:12).
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alternative orderings. Furthermore, in section 5, we exploit the fact that UM is identified
outside the VAR to obtain results that do not assume any recursive causal ordering but
which still allow for contemporaneous effects of U.S. monetary policy upon each of the
variables. These results are remarkably similar to our baseline results for UM.
The standard errors given for the impulse responses are calculated analytically via
the delta-method. Even though the U.S. monetary policy measure is a generated re-
gressor, hypothesis testing versus a null of no effect is still valid [Pagan, 1984].16 All
impulse response lines represent the percentage point response of the variable level to an
orthogonalized 100 basis point (b.p.) U.S. interest rate measure innovation.
4 Empirical results
We now present the set of impulse responses from the baseline VAR, considering: (1) the
exchange rate; (2) the foreign interest rate, output and price level; and (3) U.S. output
and prices. We close the section by describing how the predictable, dependent component
of U.S. monetary policy responds in an augmented version of the baseline VAR.
4.1 Exchange rate responses
In Figure 2, we present the response of bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates to FF and UM.
In the upper panel of Table 1, we report the percentage deviation in the exchange rate
(from its initial level) that has maximum absolute value over 12 and 48 month horizons.
An inspection of the results reveals that the identification of unpredictable and inde-
pendent federal funds rate innovations from outside the VAR has important consequences.
Excepting the case in which Canada is the foreign country, the US$ exchange rate traces
out a more pronounced U-shape following a UM innovation than it does following an
FF innovation, appreciating at a faster rate during the first 12 months and then later
16For comparison, we also calculated bootstrapped standard errors for the U.S.-Japan VAR, which do
correct for the presence of a generated regressor. Specifically, we employed a residual bootstrap with 500
replications. The bootstrapped and delta-method based standard errors were virtually identical.
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reverting to its long-run level.17 The quantitative differences in the results are large.
The maximum US$ appreciation observed within the first year after a UM innovation is
generally twice that observed in response to an FF innovation, and is more than eight
times as large in the case of the US$/JP¥ exchange rate. A comparison of our results
with those from Kim and Roubini [2000]’s non-recursive VAR identification highlights
similar differences. Exchange rate responses to UM are larger than those reported by
Kim and Roubini in all cases, except when Canada is the foreign country. When Japan is
the foreign country, they are more than five times as large. One explanation for these dif-
ferences is that exchange rate responses to predictable and dependent movements in the
federal funds rate are subject to attenuation bias, as argued in section 2.2, and that such
movements in the federal funds rate are not completely accounted for by non-recursive
identification schemes.
The exchange rate responses to a UM innovation are consistent with the impulse
response bounds for the US$/UK£ and US$/GRM presented by Faust et al. [2003]. Ac-
cording to our results, an unpredictable and independent 100 b.p. federal funds rate
increase appreciates the US$/UK£ exchange rate by 0.59% and the US$/GRM exchange
rate by 1.04% within the first month. These estimates are within Faust et al.’s bounds,
although somewhat below the midpoints, which are approximately 2.1% and 3.8% re-
spectively.18 The overall maximum exchange rate responses that we estimate are also
within Faust et al.’s bounds, exceeding the midpoint in the case of the US$/UK£ rate
and equaling the midpoint in the case of the US$/GRM rate. Such coincidence from
two different identification schemes is reassuring. Furthermore, our results indicate that
the magnitude of the exchange rate responses estimated by Faust et al., which are much
larger than those previously reported in the literature, are observed for bilateral US$
exchange rates other than those versus the UK£ and the GRM.
17The weak response of the US$/CN$ exchange rate appears to be due to Canadian interest rates
adjusting rapidly to U.S. interest rates, so that interest rate differentials and the scope for exchange rate
adjustment are short-lived.
18The latter figures are based on an inspection of Faust et al.’s Figures 3 and 4, scaled such that they
correspond to 100 b.p. innovations.
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We also calculated forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) for the exchange
rate. In some cases, they indicate that the proportion of exchange rate variance attribut-
able to U.S. monetary policy increases when predictable and dependent policy changes
are removed. For example, when Japan is the foreign country this figure increased from
1.9% to 14.5% for the 12 month horizon. However, in most cases the explanatory power
of UM for the exchange rate was similar to that of FF.19 Although the unpredictable,
independent federal funds rate component elicits larger exchange rate responses, the vari-
ation of the series is smaller than the variation in the actual federal funds rate, implying
that the overall explanatory power of the two is comparable. As such, our results do not
suggest that the fraction of historical exchange rate fluctuations attributable to mone-
tary policy is any greater than previously believed, but rather that unpredictable and
independent movements in the federal funds rate have the potential to explain relatively
large exchange rate changes.
4.2 Foreign adjustment to U.S. monetary policy
In Figure 3, we present the responses of foreign interest rates to FF and UM. In the lower
panel of Table 1, we summarize information on the maximum absolute foreign interest
rate changes observed at 12 and 48 month horizons. The picture that emerges is that
UM innovations result in much higher rates of interest rate pass-through to the other G-7
countries. A candidate explanation for these results is linked to the pattern of exchange
rate responses that we have documented. Specifically, foreign interest rate adjustment
may be a direct reaction to exchange rate movements vis-a`-vis the U.S. (e.g., in the case
of a ‘managed float’ of the currency). Alternatively, it may be an indirect reaction. For
example, a US$ appreciation may increase foreign expected inflation and output growth
via expenditure-switching, prompting increases in foreign interest rates. To the extent
that predictable and dependent federal funds rate increases induce relatively weak US$
appreciation, the pressure for increases in foreign interest rates will be muted. This
19Full FEVD results are available upon request.
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provides a potential explanation for the larger responses of foreign interest rates to UM.
The foreign interest rate responses that we estimate are typically three times larger
than those reported by Kim and Roubini using a non-recursive identification scheme.
On the other hand, our results are broadly in-line with those estimated by Faust et al.
using information from high frequency data.20 For example, the contemporaneous effects
that we estimate are 0.35 for the UK and 0.17 for Germany, and are in the middle of
Faust et al.’s bounds. The peak effects that we estimate are approximately equal to the
upper bound in the case of the UK, and about one third larger than the upper bound
in the case of Germany. These results suggest that direct interest rate linkages are an
important channel in international business cycle propagation. This contrasts with Kim
[2001], who finds little evidence of direct pass-through from the federal funds rate to other
short-term interest rates. He argues instead that international financial linkages operate
via the world long-term real interest rate.
An interesting feature of the response of foreign interest rates to UM innovations is
the negative reaction observed at long horizons, which causes the impulse response line to
follow a rotated inverse S-shape. An inspection of the U.S. monetary policy authority’s
response to UM suggests a possible explanation. In section 4.4, we present results from
VARs augmented with the predictable, dependent component of the intended federal
funds rate (PM). We find that a UM innovation induces an opposite-signed adjustment
in PM, likely to offset the effects of unpredictable interest rate changes on output and
inflation. The predictable federal funds rate response to a UM innovation is mirrored
in foreign interest rate responses. Such a correlation is consistent with either: (1) the
direct transmission to foreign rates of predictable U.S. rate changes which follow a UM
innovation; or (2) an indirect response of foreign rates arising from the foreign output and
price effects which follow a UM innovation. Consequently, at long horizons interest rate
pass-through following an unpredictable and independent U.S. monetary policy change
is negative.
20The foreign interest rates that we consider are money market rates, whereas Faust et al. consider
treasury-bill rates.
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In Figures 4 and 5, we present impulse responses for foreign output and foreign prices.
In Table 2, we summarize information on the maximum changes in these variables ob-
served at 12 and 48 month horizons. Following a U.S. monetary policy contraction, each
of the other G-7 countries experiences a recession, indicating that the direct expenditure-
reducing consequences of positive interest rate pass-through dominate any expenditure-
switching effects associated with foreign currency depreciation.21 These prosper-thy-
neighbor effects are somewhat larger than those previously documented. The maximum
foreign output response found by Kim and Roubini following a 100 b.p. U.S. tightening
entails a 0.87% reduction in output, with most of the foreign recessions being insignificant
at the 5% level. The largest foreign recession induced by UM entails a 3% output reduc-
tion; the median reduction is 1.63%. The maximum output response that we estimate for
the UK exceeds the upper bound for UK output reported by Faust et al., while the max-
imum response that we estimate for Germany is slightly smaller than the upper bound
reported by those authors. The peak effects that we estimate occur after 14 months for
the UK and 20 months for Germany, whereas the upper bound on the peaks reported by
Faust et al. occur after approximately three years. Thus, UM exerts relatively powerful
effects on foreign output in the first two years.
Turning to the results for the foreign price level, we see that the responses to a UM
innovation are larger than those to an FF innovation. In particular, an unpredictable
and independent federal funds rate increase brings about a reduction in the price level
that is significant at the 5% level in 3 of the 6 foreign countries. An actual federal funds
rate increase does not induce such a change in any of those countries. Our results differ
from those reported by Kim and Roubini. They find that the largest reduction in foreign
prices following a 100 b.p. monetary contraction is 0.58%, whereas the largest reduction in
foreign prices that we estimate is 3.96%, with a median of 1.00%. Furthermore, Kim and
Roubini’s results indicate that the price increases observed in some countries following a
U.S. monetary policy contraction can last more than four years, and are at least as big
21A recession in the U.S. may be propagated internationally via other mechanisms. For example,
reduced demand in the U.S. may feed through to other countries via trade linkages.
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as the price reductions observed in other countries during the four years that follow a
contraction. In contrast, we find that the evidence for foreign prices increases following a
UM innovation is mainly limited to the first year or two following a shock, and that any
increases in foreign prices are small relative to the price reductions that occur in other
countries.
4.3 U.S. price and output responses
The responses of U.S. prices and output to unpredictable and independent monetary
policy changes identified by Romer and Romer are investigated by them. However, most
of the evidence presented in Romer and Romer [2004] is based on single equation models.
They do consider one three variable VAR (comprising output, prices and interest rates)
that is estimated with 36 lags. The open economy VARs that we consider are richer,
with a lag structure which is more typical of the literature.
Figure 6 presents impulse response functions for U.S. output. In all six cases, the
reduction in U.S. output associated with a UM innovation exceeds that associated with
an FF innovation. This confirms R&R ’s findings from a 3-variable VAR with 36 lags.
The most striking feature of our results is the speed with which a UM innovation affects
the economy. The average time to maximum output reduction is about 12 months,
approximately half the time estimated by R&R. Cochrane [2004] argues that the 24
month lag until the maximum negative output effect of monetary policy estimated by
R&R is problematic, because existing theoretical models are generally unable to explain
such lags. From this perspective, the reduction in time to maximum negative output
response which we find is important.22
In Figure 7, we present impulse response functions for the U.S. CPI. An FF innovation
leads to a persistent increase in consumer prices. This is the price puzzle noted by Sims
[1992]. In contrast, any price puzzle associated with a UM innovation is small and
22It is also interesting to note that the delay in the response of U.S. output estimated by Faust et al.
is 24 months, coinciding with Romer and Romer [2004].
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eliminated within a few months. The expected CPI decline then begins after about one
year. After 24 months, the time at which downward price adjustment begins in R&R’s
analysis, the reduction in prices is generally significant at the 5% level and is between
one half and two thirds the total change observed after four years.23 Hence, not only is
a price puzzle avoided by employing an intended and unpredictable federal funds rate
innovation in the VAR analyzed in this paper, but the time until the onset of deflation
is greatly reduced relative to that found by R&R. This finding suggests that the delays
in price adjustment that need to be explained in theoretical work are much smaller than
previously believed.
Experiments with alternative VAR models indicated that the main reason for the
faster output and price adjustment relative to R&R is the reduction in the number of
lags included in the model, from 36 to 12. We found no evidence to support the view
that the inclusion of open economy variables in the model drives the new pattern of U.S.
output and price responses.
4.4 Interactions with predictable monetary policy
In this sub-section, we augment the baseline model with the measure of predictable,
dependent monetary policy (PM) that we constructed from the fitted values generated in
the second stage of R&R’s identification procedure. This variable is included as the sixth
variable in an expanded eight variable VAR that otherwise preserves the recursive ordering
previously described. Figure 8 shows how the predictable, dependent component of U.S.
monetary policy responds to the unpredictable, independent component of U.S. monetary
policy. The dominant response of PM is negative, often with a magnitude comparable
to the initial 100 b.p. increase in UM. Thus, after a UM innovation, the predictable and
dependent component of U.S. monetary policy moves in a manner which stabilizes the
overall intent of monetary policy. An interpretation of this pattern follows. Unpredictable
23Faust et al.’s identification scheme mitigates the price puzzle associated with U.S. monetary policy
contractions, but does not yield reductions in the U.S. price level that are significant at the 5% level.
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and independent changes in monetary policy often reflect the private beliefs of FOMC
members concerning the future direction of the U.S. economy. Such private beliefs are not
embodied in Greenbook forecasts and therefore provide a source of exogenous monetary
policy movements. In the event that these beliefs are later shown to be incorrect (output
growth and inflation deviate from target), the Federal Reserve implements predictable,
offsetting changes in monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy.24
This view of the interaction between predictable and unpredictable monetary policy
has at least two important implications for the results discussed in this paper. Firstly, the
textbook experiment of an exogenous, sustained monetary policy contraction is unlikely
to ever be observed in practice. Even an unpredictable and independent U.S. monetary
policy change is followed by offsetting movements in predictable U.S. monetary policy.
This potentially limits the peak estimated effect of monetary policy on variables such as
output, prices and the exchange rate, because the monetary policy intervention is short-
lived. A counterfactual exercise in which the stabilizing effects of predictable monetary
policy are absent may indicate that the share of macroeconomic fluctuations attributable
to monetary policy is greater than currently believed. Secondly, as noted in our discussion
of foreign interest rate dynamics, the negative interest rate pass-through observed at
long horizons following a UM innovation may reflect the foreign interest rate response
to the predictable movements in the federal funds rate that follow an unpredictable and
independent U.S. monetary policy change.
5 Robustness
We now investigate the robustness of our results. The extensions of our baseline procedure
that we consider are: (1) alternative recursive VAR identification schemes (orderings); (2)
the inclusion of additional controls; (3) an alternative lag structure; and (4) estimating
the model over different sub-samples.
24Such offsetting moves in response to random changes in monetary policy are an important part of
Engel and Frankel’s [1984] model.
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5.1 Alternative recursive VAR orderings
It is well known that the results obtained from recursive VAR identification schemes
may be sensitive to the particular variable ordering. Faust and Rogers [2003] present
evidence on this issue from an open economy VAR. They draw particular attention to
the likely simultaneity between financial market variables such as the domestic and foreign
interest rates and the exchange rate. In the present context, unpredictable federal funds
rate movements which are independent of other open economy drivers are separately
identified by the R&R procedure, using narrative evidence and Greenbook forecasts.
They are therefore more likely to be exogenous with respect to foreign interest rates and
the exchange rate.25 A logical variation on the baseline VAR ordering is therefore to
place r (UM) at the top of the system. This allows for U.S. monetary policy to have
contemporaneous effects on all of the variables. It also means that the responses to U.S.
monetary policy innovations will be invariant to the ordering of variables further down
the VAR, including the other financial variables (since they are irrelevant to the policy
innovation decomposition). Our main results are robust in this setting, especially those
for bilateral US$ exchange rates and foreign interest rates. The response of foreign output
increased slightly in some cases. For example, the reduction in Japanese output following
a UM innovation was 1.25%, a deeper recession than that obtained in the baseline case.
This may be due to the fact that the alternative VAR specification allows for UM to
exert a contemporaneous effect on foreign output. Foreign price responses were largely
unchanged using the alternative VAR ordering.
A second option that we can pursue using the unpredictable and independent federal
funds rate measure avoids imposing any recursive structure. Specifically, we estimated a
model that allows for direct contemporaneous effects of U.S. monetary policy on each of
the other variables. This is accomplished by adding the current dated value of r (UM)
25This assumes that the Federal Reserve does not set interest rates in response to foreign interest
rates and the exchange rate. Romer and Romer [2004] argue that this is generally the case, but note an
exception to the rule in the six month period spanning the final quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of
1985. We address this possibility in section 5.4.
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to each equation in the VAR model (excepting the equation for the U.S. interest rate)
and then generating impulse responses by considering innovations to the reduced form
equation for UM. Since unpredictable U.S. monetary policy changes are identified with
information from outside the VAR, such an approach is feasible. In general, the results
that we obtained were very similar to those from the baseline exercise. A noteworthy
finding was that the contemporaneous effects of UM on the exchange rate and foreign
interest rates were closer to the midpoints of the bounds for those responses reported by
Faust et al.. Overall, our findings concerning the effects of unpredictable and indepen-
dent federal funds rate changes do not appear to depend upon particular aspects of the
recursive VAR identification employed.
5.2 Additional controls
Sims [1992] argues that increases in commodity prices often raise inflation, leading to
higher nominal interest rates. A commodity price index can act as an ‘information
variable’ that controls for these episodes, potentially mitigating the price puzzle and
other anomalies associated with federal funds rate innovations. To address this possibility,
we included the log level of the commodity price index from the International Monetary
Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) as the fifth variable in the estimated VARs.
This ordering reflects the approach taken by Kim [2001]. We summarize the main findings
here.26
The exchange rate responses that we estimated were generally consistent with those
from the baseline models. In the case in which Germany is the foreign country, the
difference between the maximum US$ appreciations associated with a UM innovation and
an FF innovation narrowed slightly. In other cases, the maximum appreciation associated
with a UM innovation fell relative to the baseline estimates. However, the maximum
appreciation associated with an FF innovation also fell, such that the difference between
the two was preserved. For example, the maximum appreciations for the US$/UK£ rate
26Full details of the additional results discussed are available upon request.
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were 3.1% after a UM innovation and 1.4% after an FF innovation. The corresponding
figures from the baseline results were 4.2% and 2.2% respectively. These changes reflect
the fact that some exchange rate movements previously attributed to monetary policy
are now attributed to commodity price fluctuations.
We observed some reductions in interest rate pass-through following a UM innovation
in those cases in which either Italy or the United Kingdom was the foreign country.
However, in the other four cases the levels of interest rate pass-through seen in the
baseline results proved robust. This finding is contrary to the claim in Kim [2001] that
controlling for commodity prices eliminates interest rate pass-through from the U.S. to
the other G-7 countries, through absorbing common shocks to world interest rates. The
foreign output and price responses generally changed very little relative to the baseline
estimates.
A second extension of the information set in the baseline VAR involved adding a time
trend to each equation. Giordani [2004] showed that the removal of the underlying trend
from variables such as output can eliminate the price puzzle associated with the federal
funds rate. The main changes in our results were reductions in the price rises observed in
the U.S. and the foreign country following an FF innovation in the bilateral VARs with
France, Germany and Italy. This finding is consistent with the results in Giordani [2004].
However, in each of these cases the deflationary effects of a UM innovation remained much
stronger than the deflationary effects of an FF innovation. When Canada, Japan or the
United Kingdom was the foreign country, the dominant responses of U.S. and foreign
prices to FF innovations were positive, whilst the dominant responses to UM innovations
were negative. Finally, the responses of the two financial market variables, namely the
bilateral US$ exchange rate and the foreign interest rate, changed little with the addition
of a time trend.
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5.3 An alternative lag structure
Open economy VAR models fitted using monthly data often feature 6 lags rather than
12. In section 3, we noted that 12 lags are required to remove evidence of residual serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity. Nevertheless, we estimated each of the models using
6 lags in order to judge the sensitivity of our results along this dimension. Our findings
were robust in most cases. However, in the VAR where Germany was the foreign country,
the maximum responses of the exchange rate, the foreign interest rate and foreign output
to a UM innovation decreased relative to the baseline case; they were much closer to
the estimated responses to an FF innovation. There was also some narrowing of the gap
between the peak exchange rate responses to UM and FF in the models where France
and Italy were the foreign countries. Hence, our main results are slightly weaker when
the empirical models are fitted using 6 lags rather than 12. However, we stress that our
core results are associated with the more general lag structure, and that the restricted
lag structure induces serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
5.4 Sub-sample stability
The final part of our robustness analysis is based on sub-sample regressions. Romer and
Romer [2004] note that during the early stages of Volcker’s chairmanship of the Federal
Reserve, policy was often implemented by targeting quantities (the level of non-borrowed
reserves) rather than the federal funds rate. This experiment lasted until June 1981.
Thus, we fitted the baseline VARs for the period 1982:6-1996:12, so that no observations
prior to 1981:7 are used in the estimation. This sub-sample also excluded the turbulent
years of the 1970s. The second sub-sample for which we estimated the VARs begins at
the same time as the core sample and ends in 1992:8. This led to the exclusion of the
exchange rate crises that saw the UK£ and the IT₤ drop out of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the bands for the FRF/GRM rate widened.
The key points are as follows. Firstly, during the post-1982:6 period both U.S. mone-
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tary policy measures generated exchange rate responses that were larger than those esti-
mated using the full sample. For example, the US$/JP¥ rate appreciated 16% following
a UM innovation, and 7% following an FF innovation. In general, during the post-1982:6
period, exchange rate responses to UM innovations were larger than the responses to FF
innovations, with an exception where France was the foreign country. Turning to the
responses of foreign interest rates, higher interest rate pass-through in response to UM
innovations were observed in the post-1982:6 sub-sample. The French results again were
exceptional, yielding equal interest rate pass-through for the two U.S. monetary policy
measures.
The foreign price and output responses that we estimated using the post-1982:6 period
were less robust than the financial variable responses. Following a UM innovation, there
was little evidence of a foreign recession in Italy or Japan, and persistent price increases
were observed for Canada and Germany. One reason for these results may be that
estimating the responses of output and prices to monetary policy requires longer spans
of data than does estimating the responses of financial market variables, since the former
are relatively slow-moving and complete only a small number of cycles during the 14
years covered by the sub-sample.
The results that we obtained using a sub-sample ending in 1992:8 were much closer
to the full sample results for each of the variables, reflecting the fact that the sample was
trimmed by a smaller amount in this case. Importantly, the responses of US$ exchange
rates versus the FRF, IT₤ and the UK£ did not change very much after excluding the
period in the 1990s, in which there was some turbulence in European interest rates and
exchange rates.
The final issue that we addressed was the importance of the six month period spanning
the final quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985. As noted previously, there is
some evidence that during this time the Federal Reserve adjusted the federal funds rate
in response to the value of the US$. In this case, the unpredictable and independent
federal funds rate measure that we consider may be predicted by and dependent upon
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the exchange rate. We re-estimated each of the baseline VARs after including six impulse
dummies for the months in question, but did not observe any important changes in our
core results.27
6 Conclusion
We have argued that predictable and dependent movements in the federal funds rate lead
to attenuation bias in the estimated effect of U.S. monetary policy on the exchange rate
and foreign interest rates, outputs and prices. We investigated this argument by estimat-
ing the open economy consequences of a new U.S. monetary policy measure based upon
the work of Romer and Romer [2004]. The monetary policy identification procedure
isolates unpredictable federal funds rate changes which are independent of other open
economy drivers by combining narrative evidence on Federal Reserve intentions with the
information embodied in the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook forecasts. Our results indi-
cate that unpredictable and independent federal funds rate changes exert much larger
effects on bilateral US$ exchange rates and foreign interest rates than do actual fed-
eral funds rate changes (on average 2.5 times larger and 1.75 times larger respectively).
We also find larger prosper-thy-neighbor foreign output and price effects in response
to unpredictable and independent U.S. monetary policy, potentially indicating that the
expenditure-reducing effects of interest rate pass-through overwhelm the expenditure-
switching effects of exchange rate depreciation.
A comparison of our results with those from alternative identification schemes re-
vealed: (1) little support for the results obtained using non-recursive VAR restrictions;
and (2) a general concordance with the results from VAR restrictions derived from high
frequency asset price behaviour. As the identification strategy that we employ is more
readily implemented than that based upon high frequency asset price-based VAR restric-
27Strictly speaking, given that the VAR is of order 12 the model should include 12 lags of each of the
impulse dummies in order to completely remove the six problematic observations from the likelihood
function. However, the resulting parameter profligacy would lead to a substantial reduction in the
effective degrees of freedom.
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tions, we are able to estimate the effects of U.S. monetary policy for a broader range
of countries. These estimates proved robust along several dimensions, including alterna-
tive recursive VAR orderings, the addition of other information variables, and the use of
various sub-samples.
For future research, our analysis has at least three important implications. Firstly,
when estimating the international effects of monetary policy, it is necessary to identify
policy changes which are unpredictable and independent of other open economy drivers.
For example, this point is relevant for the literature which assesses German monetary pol-
icy’s influence upon European business cycles. Secondly, bilateral open economy models
should be capable of generating large and positive interest rate pass-through from the
U.S. to the foreign country, as such a channel is critical to the international transmission
of U.S. monetary policy. Thirdly, the estimated effects of U.S. monetary policy upon
open economy variables, against which simulation results from calibrated open economy
models may be compared, are larger than previously believed.
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Note:  Experiment is a 1 percentage point temporary increase in US interest rate measure.
All responses are in percentage points. Standard errors are calculated via delta−method.
System is ordered as [y,p,y*,p*,r,r*,s].
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Figure 5:
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Note:  Experiment is a 1 percentage point temporary increase in US interest rate measure.
All responses are in percentage points. Standard errors are calculated via delta−method.
System is ordered as [y,p,y*,p*,r,r*,s].
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Figure 6:
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Note:  Experiment is a 1 percentage point temporary increase in US interest rate measure.
All responses are in percentage points. Standard errors are calculated via delta−method.
System is ordered as [y,p,y*,p*,r,r*,s].
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Figure 7:
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Note:  Experiment is a 1 percentage point temporary increase in US interest rate measure.
All responses are in percentage points. Standard errors are calculated via delta−method.
System is ordered as [y,p,y*,p*,r,r*,s].
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Figure 8:
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Note:  Experiment is a 1 percentage point temporary increase in US interest rate measure.
All responses are in percentage points. Standard errors are calculated via delta−method.
System is ordered as [y,p,y*,p*,UM,PM,r*,s].
U.S. Predictable Monetary Policy Rate
Bilateral Open Economy VAR Impulse Response
38
Table 1:
Maximum exchange rate responses
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Country FF/UM Maximum response (t-ratio) Timing Maximum response (t-ratio) Timing
Canada FF 0.73 (4.72) 1 0.73 (4.72) 1
UM -1.23 (1.40) 12 -1.35 (1.54) 13
France FF 2.36 (3.28) 6 2.55 (4.51) 32
UM 5.13 (2.43) 8 7.00 (2.30) 31
Germany FF 1.39 (2.70) 2 1.86 (2.98) 41
UM 3.30 (2.51) 2 4.31 (2.35) 18
Italy FF 1.59 (3.18) 2 1.59 (3.18) 2
UM 4.26 (3.35) 2 4.26 (3.35) 2
Japan FF 1.05 (2.55) 1 2.31 (3.93) 28
UM 8.90 (3.20) 9 9.21 (2.74) 17
UK FF 2.19 (2.89) 6 2.19 (2.89) 6
UM 4.19 (2.29) 5 4.19 (2.29) 5
Maximum foreign interest rate responses
Canada FF 1.22 (9.09) 2 1.22 (9.09) 2
UM 2.79 (6.58) 2 2.79 (6.58) 2
France FF 0.67 (5.03) 6 0.67 (5.03) 6
UM 2.30 (5.15) 7 2.30 (5.15) 7
Germany FF 0.47 (3.97) 5 0.47 (3.97) 5
UM 1.12 (3.61) 6 1.12 (3.61) 6
Italy FF 0.36 (1.87) 7 0.40 (2.10) 16
UM 1.00 (2.02) 7 -1.24 (2.37) 48
Japan FF 0.41 (4.48) 7 0.41 (4.48) 7
UM 1.34 (3.95) 12 1.34 (3.95) 12
UK FF 1.08 (4.43) 12 1.08 (4.43) 12
UM 1.14 (1.89) 4 1.14 (1.89) 4
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute change in the US$ and the foreign interest 
rate within 12 and 48 month intervals following a 100 basis point increase in US interest rates. The 
units are percentage points. In the exchange rate panel positive numbers denote appreciation. The t-
ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing indicates the number of months after which a 
maximum occurs.
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Table 2:
Maximum foreign output responses
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Country FF/UM Maximum response (t-ratio) Timing Maximum response (t-ratio) Timing
Canada FF -0.45 (1.63) 11 -0.80 (3.72) 25
UM -1.42 (1.80) 10 -1.42 (1.80) 10
France FF 0.40 (2.47) 1 -0.47 (2.04) 20
UM -1.31 (1.62) 9 -1.95 (2.34) 18
Germany FF 0.23 (0.96) 4 -0.62 (3.19) 21
UM 0.55 (0.84) 5 -0.86 (1.50) 20
Italy FF 0.76 (2.66) 4 0.76 (2.66) 4
UM 1.88 (2.48) 5 -3.00 (3.88) 21
Japan FF 0.36 (1.91) 4 -0.48 (1.41) 27
UM 0.79 (1.17) 6 0.79 (1.17) 6
UK FF -0.40 (1.58) 12 -0.70 (3.25) 23
UM -1.72 (2.46) 10 -1.83 (2.61) 14
Maximum foreign price level responses
Canada FF 0.33 (3.27) 12 0.49 (3.73) 20
UM -0.39 (1.69) 11 -1.29 (3.88) 48
France FF 0.36 (2.86) 12 0.41 (1.97) 28
UM 0.81 (2.50) 11 -1.81 (2.30) 48
Germany FF 0.06 (2.88) 5 0.06 (2.88) 5
UM 0.19 (2.56) 8 0.19 (2.56) 8
Italy FF 0.11 (0.78) 7 0.17 (0.70) 15
UM 0.31 (1.06) 6 -3.96 (3.03) 48
Japan FF 0.41 (2.43) 11 0.46 (2.20) 21
UM 0.56 (0.97) 12 -0.71 (0.87) 48
UK FF 0.50 (1.87) 12 0.59 (2.05) 20
UM 1.60 (2.54) 10 1.60 (2.54) 10
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute changes in foreign output and the foreign 
price level within 12 and 48 month intervals following a 100 basis point increase in US interest rates. 
The units are percentage points. The t-ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing 
indicates the number of months after which a maximum occurs.
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A Appendix
Table A.1:
Residual diagnostics for VAR models
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.412 0.424 0.75
p 0.972 0.51 0.232
y* 0.049 0.402 0
p* 0.175 0.929 0
r 0.046 0.11 0
r* 0.917 0.119 0
s 0.311 0.742 0.929
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.37 1 0.076
p 0.377 1 0
y* 0.689 1 0
p* 0.643 1 0
r 0.003 1 0
r* 0.3 1 0
s 0.319 1 0.321
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.627 1 0.002
p 0.013 0.998 0.5
y* 0.375 1 0
p* 0.712 1 0
r 0 1 0
r* 0.056 0.748 0
s 0.611 1 0.153
Foreign country: Canada
Foreign country: France
Foreign country: Germany
Notes: The figures reported are p-values from the following tests: AR(1-7) is 
an F-test of the hypothesis that the errors are serially uncorrelated at lags 1-
7. Heteroscedasticity is an F-test of unconditional homoscedasticity in the 
errors, and Normality a Jarque-Bera test of normality of the errors.
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Table A.1: continued
Residual diagnostics for VAR models
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.212 1 0.001
p 0.074 1 0.001
y* 0.098 0.988 0
p* 0.553 0.994 0
r 0.165 1 0
r* 0.521 1 0
s 0.307 1 0.01
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.806 1 0.362
p 0.33 1 0
y* 0.479 1 0.173
p* 0.734 0.866 0
r 0.177 1 0
r* 0.894 1 0
s 0.412 1 0.002
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y 0.101 1 0.236
p 0.313 1 0
y* 0.2 1 0
p* 0.373 1 0
r 0.102 0.953 0
r* 0.608 1 0
s 0.56 1 0.009
Foreign country: Italy
Foreign country: Japan
Foreign country: UK
Notes: The figures reported are p-values from the following tests: AR(1-7) is 
an F-test of the hypothesis that the errors are serially uncorrelated at lags 1-
7. Heteroscedasticity is an F-test of unconditional homoscedasticity in the 
errors, and Normality a Jarque-Bera test of normality in the errors.
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Table A.2:
Variable Source
Bilateral dollar Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
exchange rates Foreign exchange releases
URL: federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/
Consumer prices International Financial Statistics, line 64 ... ZF
Industrial production International Financial Statistics, line 66 ... CZF
Foreign interest rates International Financial Statistics, line 60B ... ZF
Federal funds rate AER data archive
URL: www.e-aer.org/data
Intended, unanticipated federal funds AER data archive
rate changes at FOMC meetings URL: www.e-aer.org/data
World commodity prices AER data archive
URL: www.e-aer.org/data
Data sources
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